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CASE COMMENT 
 
Lorna Richardson* 
Commercial Common Sense in Contractual Interpretation: Further Views from the 
Inner House 
 
In recent years there have been a number of cases in both Scotland and England 
where the use of commercial common sense in interpreting  commercial contracts 
has been discussed.1 Hoe International Ltd v Andersen and Another2 is the latest 
offering by the Inner House on the issue. In this case the court made some 
controversial comments on the use of commercial common sense in interpreting 
commercial contracts. 
A THE FACTS 
The defenders had sold a company, Speyside Distillers Co Ltd, to Hoe. A claim was 
made against Speyside by another company, Chalmers, which appeared to be in 
breach of a warranty given by the defenders in terms of the share purchase agreement 
(SPA) providing for the sale of Speyside. Following intimation of the claim against 
Speyside, Hoe issued a notice to the defenders purporting to intimate a breach of 
warranty. The SPA made provision for such notice. The issue for the court was whether 
the notice sent by Hoe was valid in terms of the SPA to intimate the breach of warranty.  
The defenders took issue with (i) the content of the notice and (ii) the way in which it 
was served. The SPA provided that 
the [defenders] are not liable for a claim… unless [Hoe] has given the 
[defenders] notice in writing of such claim…, giving reasonable details of all 
material aspects of such claim… known to [Hoe], including [Hoe’s] bona fide 
estimate of the amount thereof and detailing [Hoe’s] calculation of the loss 
alleged to have been suffered by it.3 
The SPA further provided that Hoe was to notify the defenders in writing as soon as 
reasonably practicable of any claim.4 Notices were to be delivered personally or sent 
by pre-paid first class post or recorded delivery. Notices were to be sent to the 
defenders’ solicitors, marked for the attention of MH.5  
The notice sent by Hoe stated that it constituted notice as required by the SPA. The 
notice enclosed a copy of the correspondence that had been received from Chalmers’ 
                                                             
* Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1 See for instance Grove Investments Ltd v Cape Building Products Ltd [2014] CSIH 43; 2014 
Hous LR 35 and @SIPP Pension Trustees Ltd v Insight Travel Services Ltd [2015] CSIH 91; 
2016 SC 243 in Scotland. For English developments see Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; 
[2015] AC 1619; and Wood v Sureterm Direct Ltd [2017] UKSC 24; [2017] 2 WLR 1095. 
2 [2017] CSIH 9; 2017 G.W.D. 6-83. 
3 Para [7].  
4 Ibid.  
5 Para [8].  
solicitors and the enclosures that had been sent with that correspondence. The notice 
was sent by DX, marked for the attention of SC.6 
B COMMERCIAL COMMON SENSE IN THE INTERPRETIVE EXERCISE 
In order to determine whether the notice was valid the court had to interpret the SPA, 
which contained the notice provisions. The bench comprised Lord Drummond Young, 
Lord Menzies and Lord Malcolm, with Lord Drummond Young delivering the opinion of 
the court. He noted that the Lord Ordinary had treated as definitive the principles of 
contractual interpretation summarised by Lord Neuberger in Arnold v Britton.7 That, in 
the Inner House’s view, was an oversimplification of what was said in Arnold. Lord 
Drummond Young noted that the discussion in Arnold was not about the general 
principles that applied to commercial interpretation but a discussion of particular 
elements that were relevant to the problem before the court in that case, which was an 
unusual case.8 Indeed, Arnold represented an example, perhaps rare, of a clause 
which had “true mathematical uncertainty”.9 The Inner House were of the view that 
Lord Neuberger’s comments in Arnold were directed towards the relatively extreme 
case where it is argued that rewriting of a clause is required and not with the ordinary 
case of construction of a clause containing a degree of ambiguity. The court opined 
that for the proper approach to ordinary cases of contractual interpretation regard 
should be had to the factors identified by Lord Hodge in Arnold and to Lord Clarke in 
Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank.10 This approach could be summed up in the passage from 
Lord Clarke, which had been cited by Lord Hodge in Arnold, 
It is not necessary to conclude that, unless the most natural meaning of the 
word produces a result so extreme as to suggest that it was unintended, the 
court must give effect to that meaning. 
The language used by the parties will often have more than one potential 
meaning. I would accept… that the exercise of construction is essentially one 
unitary exercise of which the court must consider the language used and 
ascertain what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the 
background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the 
parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract, would 
have understood the parties to have meant. In doing so, the court must have 
regard to all the relevant surrounding circumstances. If there are two possible 
constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent 
with business common sense and to reject the other.11 
The Inner House went on to note that if courts adopted an over-strict and over-literal 
approach to interpretation the result would be much longer contracts, incorporating a 
large number of terms to deal with what were, realistically, unlikely scenarios. By 
                                                             
6 Paras [9]-[12]. 
7 Supra n 1. 
8 Paras [18] and [20]. For a discussion of Arnold see R C Connal “Has the rainy sky dried up? 
Arnold v Britton and commercial interpretation”, 2016 Edin LR 20(1), 71. 
9 Para [20].  
10 [2011] UKSC 50; [2011] 1 WLR 2900. 
11 Rainy Sky at para [20-21], cited in para [22] of Hoe.  
contrast, if a contextual and purposive construction and commercial common sense 
were given proper weight contracts would be shorter and could focus more precisely 
on the important features of the parties’ transaction. The court noted that it might be 
argued that such an approach would result in more protracted and expensive litigation 
when a dispute arose, but countered this by pointing out that disputes were the 
exception. Indeed, any increase in the cost of litigation would be significantly smaller 
than the increase in transaction costs of long and protracted contract drafting of all 
commercial contracts.12  
The court went on to state that evidence about commercial context would not be 
required in every case. With the common forms of contract it could be expected that 
the commercial context would be comfortably within judicial knowledge. If there were 
special or unusual features to the context, notice of those could be given in the parties’ 
pleadings to discover how much of the background was disputed. This would, said the 
court, go a long way to dealing with lengthy proofs. Furthermore, relying on courts to 
adopt a sensible commercial interpretation would lead to greater predictability as 
contracts would be construed according to the standards of a reasonable commercial 
person.13 
C THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTICE 
In determining whether the content of the notice was sufficient (issue (i)) the court drew 
on the reasonable recipient test set out in Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life 
Assurance.14 The court noted that the purpose of a contractual notice was relevant to 
interpreting the notice and its validity. In Hoe the purpose of the notice was to give the 
defenders sufficient information to determine whether they wished to take over the 
defence of Chalmers’ claim.15 The court found that the notice sent by Hoe contained 
sufficient detail. In providing a copy of the letter of claim against Speyside and the 
enclosures, Hoe were providing all of the information they had about the claim at the 
time of sending the notice. While the SPA required a bona fide estimate of the claim 
to be provided the court found that all Hoe could do was pass on the claim against 
Speyside taking it at face value, until such time as further, and possibly prolonged, 
investigations could be carried out.16 This was especially the case given that the SPA 
required notice to be given as soon as reasonably practicable.17  
In relation to service (issue (ii)) two distinct purposes were potentially relevant: (1) the 
purpose of the notice itself; and (2) the purpose of any particular contractual 
requirement that had not been met.18 The court opined that it could, in general, be said 
that the more drastic the consequences of a notice the greater the need for strict 
compliance with what was prescribed in the contract. The notice in Hoe, of a breach 
of a warranty in an SPA, was at the less drastic end of the scale, such that there was 
no overwhelming need for rigid formality.19 The purpose of the notice was to give the 
                                                             
12 Paras [24] – [25].  
13 Paras [25] – [26].  
14 [1997] AC 749. 
15 Para [47].  
16 Paras [48] – [52].  
17 Para [48]. 
18 Para [34].  
19 Ibid.  
defenders the opportunity to deal with the defence of the claim against Speyside. It 
was, said the court, of the utmost importance that any notice should arrive in the hands 
of someone with authority to act. Provided the notice arrived in the hands of such a 
person other requirements may not be important, especially if they were of an 
essentially formal nature.20 The court considered that the fundamental question was 
perhaps: if a particular formal requirement is not complied with is the would-be recipient 
prejudiced in a practical sense? If not, the court should be slow to hold that failure to 
comply with a formal requirement was fatal.21 The court went on to note that such an 
approach would also apply where the purpose of the notice was drastic, such as where 
the court was asked to determine the validity of a break notice in respect of a lease.22 
If there was no prejudice, insisting on strict compliance for its own sake served no 
useful purpose.23 The fact that the notice in Hoe was marked for the attention of the 
wrong person and was sent by DX did not prevent the notice from being valid.24  
D CONCLUSIONS 
This case is important in relation to the law regarding contractual notices, as well as 
interpretation of commercial contracts more generally. In relation to notices, the case 
suggests a degree of latitude in strict adherence to the terms of the contract in 
relation to service25 provided the recipient does not suffer prejudice from a practical 
perspective. While the issue was different26 in West Dunbartonshire Council v William 
Thompson & Son (Dumbarton) Ltd,27 with the notice being addressed to the wrong 
tenant company, the fact that it was received and opened by a director of the correct 
tenant company was said to be “nothing to the point”.28 It might be said that these 
cases are inconsistent with each other. Another view, which was the view of the court 
in Hoe, is that the matter is one of degree. If there are sufficiently serious failings in 
the form requirements of the notice it will be invalid, even where it gets to the correct 
recipient. Less serious failings, such as service by a different method to that required 
by the contract, will not affect the validity of the notice provided it reaches the 
intended recipient, who suffers no real prejudice as a result.  
While one may have sympathy with the law allowing room for argument regarding 
form requirements where the intended recipient receives the notice29 and it seems 
                                                             
20 Para [35].   
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. Such notices allow one of the parties, usually the tenant to bring the lease to a 
premature end. This comment seems to contradict the discussion in Hoe that the more drastic 
the consequences of the notice the greater the need for strict compliance with what is 
prescribed in the contract. 
23 Para [35].  
24 Paras [53] – [56].  
25 There is Scottish authority for taking such a view – referred to in paras [37]-[42]. There is 
also authority the other way, advocating strict compliance with the requirements of the 
contract. The position is similar in England where there have been cases going either way – 
see paras [43] – [44]. 
26 As pointed out by the Inner House in Hoe as a reason for distinguishing the case: see para 
[42].  
27 [2015] CSIH 93; 2016 SLT 125. 
28 Ibid at [31].  
29 Particularly in a case such as West Dunbartonshire Council where the landlord was 
seeking to increase the rent from £210 per annum to £13,800 per annum on a lease that had 
that he is seeking to free himself from the consequences of the notice on a 
technicality, it is suggested that such as approach leaves room for doubt about what 
is a sufficiently serious failing. Certainty is of paramount importance in commercial 
matters. Taking a stricter approach on the issue of validity may result in some 
decisions that seem unfair on their facts, but which has the benefit of certainty, in 
knowing that to be valid a notice must comply with the terms of the contract. This is 
especially the case when it is generally not difficult to consult the contract and 
comply with the notice requirements. It is suggested that the approach adopted by 
the Inner House in Hoe is likely to lead to more disputes over the validity of notices, 
in situations where it is beneficial that parties are clear on whether they have or have 
not validly exercised a right under a contract.  
What is striking in relation to interpretation is the approach taken by the Inner House 
to Arnold in order to continue to be able to make significant use of commercial common 
sense in the interpretive exercise. Many Scottish cases since the decision in Arnold 
have made reference to it, and to Lord Neuberger’s comments in particular on the 
importance of the language the parties used in their contract and a more limited role 
for commercial common sense, as a summary of the law on contract interpretation.30 
It was not considered to be limited to its unusual facts by other courts, including the 
Inner House.31 In this case, the Inner House rears against this understanding of that 
case. Lord Drummond Young appears to be very intent on courts being able to make 
use of commercial common sense. 32 Not only that, but he has confidence that judges 
are able to judge what is commercially sensible, often without evidence on the matter, 
with the commercial context of common contracts being said to be within judicial 
knowledge. While judges, particularly in the commercial court, may have a good feel 
for what is happening in the market and in particular industries, it must be seriously 
doubted that this is the case for all judges. It seems farfetched to say that a sheriff, 
often spending significant amounts of time hearing family and criminal matters, is up 
to speed with the commercial context of common commercial contracts. Indeed, 
judges are four steps removed from commercial men and women. Commercial clients 
instruct solicitors. If there is a dispute counsel will often be instructed with the case 
heard by the judge. One wonders how many judges, so far removed from commercial 
activities, will feel comfortable with the professed extent of their judicial knowledge.   
Finally, it is suggested that the use of commercial common sense is not likely to lead 
to a reduction in costs for contracting parties. On the contrary, using commercial 
common sense, to such an extent in the interpretive exercise, is likely to result in more 
disputes as to the meaning of a contractual provision, with the consequent costs 
involved in cases ultimately having to be determined by the court. Furthermore, the 
                                                             
been in place since 1971 and would, as a result of the decision, run until 2031 at a rent of 
£210 per annum. 
30 See for instance the Lord Ordinary’s approach in Hoe [2016] CSOH 33; 2016 G.W.D. 7-
142; @SIPP, supra n 1; Gyle Shopping Centre General Partners Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc 
[2016] CSIH 19; 2016 GWD 10-205; AWG Business Centres Ltd v Regus Caledonia Ltd and 
Cheshire West and Chester Council [2017] CSIH 22; 2016 GWD 9-131; and Hill v Stewart 
Milne Group Ltd and Anr [2016] CSIH 35; 2017 SCLR 92. 
31 Ibid.  
32 As well as Lord Drummond Young’s comments in Hoe see his comments in Grove, supra n 
1. Grove has been criticised: see the comments in @SIPP, supra n 1 and also L Macgregor, 
“Crossing the Line between Business Common Sense and Perceived Fairness in Contractual 
Interpretation”, Edin LR 2015 19(3) 378. 
Scottish judiciary seem at odds as to what is commercially sensible. In Grove 
Investments Ltd v Cape Building Products Ltd33 the Inner House held that the common 
law could serve as a benchmark as to what was commercially sensible, with the court 
characterising contracts as co-operative enterprises, entered into by the parties for 
their mutual benefit, so that they should be interpreted in such a way that there is no 
windfall gain or disproportionate loss for either of the parties. Yet, in @SIPP Pension 
Trustees Ltd v Insight Travel Services Ltd34 a differently constituted bench of the Inner 
House noted that commercial contracts did not have to be fair and were often hard 
fought, with each party seeking to achieve their own objective.  
Given the approach of the Inner House to the decision of Arnold, Hoe creates doubt 
as to when the court can have regard to commercial common sense and the 
importance to be given to the words used in the contract.35 There is the further problem 
that there is no clear understanding of commercial common sense among the Inner 
House. This presents those tasked with advising clients on how a court is likely to 
interpret a contract with an unenviable task.   
 
                                                             
33 Supra n 1.  
34 Supra n 1. 
35 Although some assistance may be derived from the recent Supreme Court decision of 
Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd, supra n 1. 
